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Incentive Compatible Referenda and
the Valuation of Environmental Goods
Laura O. Taylor
Recent attempts to test the validity of the contingent valuation method have relied on
laboratory-type experiments. In these experiments, willingness to pay responses in
hypothetical choice experiments are compared with responses from choice experiments
requiring actual payments. Often evidence of hypothetical bias is found. Critical for these
experimental tests of hypothetical surveys is that the methodology used to elicit willingness to
pay from subjects in the real-payment experiment be demand revealing. If it is not, then
differences in responses to hypothetical and real valuation questions could be due to
free-riding in the real-payment survey and not due to hypdzefical bias in the hypothetical
survey, This paper reports on experiments that implement a theoretically incentive-compatible
revelation mechanism (a closed referendum) to elicit responses to valuation questions in both
hypothetical and real experiments. As in earlier studies, evidence of an upward hypothetical
bias is found.
Testing of the validity of contingent valuation
(CV) surveys using methods similar to those em-
ployed in experimental economics has grown con-
siderably in recent years. These tests employ eco-
nomic decision experiments where subjects re-
spond to both hypothetical and real valuation
questions. 1 Results from such experiments often
indicate significant differences between responses
to the hypothetical and real valuation questions.2
Such differences are cotnmonly interpreted as re-
flecting “hypothetical bias.” Critical for these ex-
perimental tests of hypothetical surveys is that the
methodology used to elicit willingness to pay
(WTP) from subjects in the real-payment survey be
demand revealing. If a demand revealing mecha-
nism is used, then tests of an identical but hypo-
thetical survey may be conducted by comparing
results from the two experimental treatments.
However, if a demand revealing mechanism is not
used, then the real-payment scenario is not the cor-
rect benchmark with which responses to hypotheti-
cal surveys should be compared.3 This point is es-
pecially important for public goods valuation. If
the real-payment experiment is not demand reveal-
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ing, then differences in responses to hypothetical
and real valuation questions could be due to ~ree-
ridirtg in the real-payment scenario and not due to
hypothetical bias in the hypothetical survey.
One particular experimental design, introduced
by Cummings et al. (1997; hereafter referred to as
CEHM) and employed by Cummings and Taylor
(forthcoming; hereafter referred to as CT), Cum-
mings and Taylor (1998), and Bjornstad, Cum-
mings, and Osborne (1997), uses a referendum
payment mechanism to test the validity of hypo-
thetical surveys, All of these studies conduct ref-
erenda where subjects vote on a proposition that
would require all subjects in the experiment to pay
money to a public good if the referendum passes
(i.e., if more than 50% vote yes). They conduct two
treatments of this referendum, one in which pay-
ments are hypothetical (referred to as the ‘‘hypo-
thetical referendum”) and one in which actual cash
payments are required by the respondents if the
referendum passes (referred to as the “real refer-
endum” ). The predominant result from these stud-
ies is that a significantly larger proportion of re-
spondents votes yes in the hypothetical referenda
than in the real referenda.4 This finding is impor-
tant because the referendum format, under certain
conditions, is theoretically an incentive compatible
method for valuing public goods.
Evidence of hypothetical bias in an incentive
compatible elicitation method such as the referen-
dum is a significant finding for the conduct of CV
surveys. However, it must be the case that the realTaylor Incentive Compatible Referenda 133
referendum is indeed incentive compatible. Imple-
mentation of a perfectly incentive compatible elici-
tation method is often difficult, and the referendum
design used by the authors cited above may not
have had all the properties required for a theoret-
ically incentive compatible referendum. If this is
the case, it would be impossible to determine from
their experiments alone whether their results are
due to the presence of hypothetical bias in the hy-
pothetical referenda or to the presence of free-
riding in the real referenda.s This paper reports on
experiments that incorporate the conditions for
theoretical incentive compatibility in referenda that
are missing from previous validation tests using
this elicitation method. Results from these ex~eri- .
ments suggest that hypothetical bias, and not free-
riding behavior, is the likely reason there are dif-
ferences in voting behavior in the real and hypo-
thetical referenda.
The next section of this paper discusses the
properties that a referendum needs for it to be an
incentive compatible valuation method for public
goods and relates these properties to previous stud-
ies that conducted referendum experiments. The
following sections describe the experimental de-
sign used in CEHM and CT and altered here to
encompass all properties for incentive compatibil-
ity, report results from the experiments, and offer
concluding comments.
Incentive Compatible Referenda
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) indepen-
dently developed the conditions under which deci-
sion rules that map individual preferences over al-
ternatives into a single collective preference order-
ing for the entire group are strategy-proof, or
incentive compatible. A mechanism for eliciting
individual preferences is strategy-proof when the
individual’s optimal choice is to reveal his/her
true preference ordering, In other words, the elici-
tation mechanism is incentive compatible if there
are no incentives to misrepresent true preferences.
A binary choice referendum (e.g., one may vote
for candidate A or B only, or one may vote yes
or no on a project) is strategy-proof when the vot-
ing rule is a simple majority rule (i.e., the referen-
dum asses if more than 50% of respondents vote
? yes). In this case, revealing anything other than
one’s true preferences in an anonymous vote can-
not enhance one’s chances of receiving one’s pre-
ferred outcome (see Moulin 1988 for a formal
proo~.
In the literature using experiments to validate
CV surveys, the methods used to elicit preferences
are often not incentive compatible. For example, a
commonly used elicitation method is the voluntary
contributions mechanism—a mechanism in which
it could be optimal for respondents to reveal less
than their true willingness to pay for public goods,
as it may be in their best interests to free-ride.7 In
these types of studies, it is impossible to identify
whether differences in hypothetical and real WTP
for a public good are due to hypothetical bias in-
troducing an upward bias of revealed WTP in the
hypothetical survey or whether such differences
are due to free-riding introducing a downward bias
of revealed WTP in the real survey. CEHM pro-
posed one experimental design intended to avoid
this “observational equivalence” in the data,
CEHM conducted binary choice, majority rule ref-
erenda in which groups of respondents voted on a
proposition that requires everyone in the group to
donate $10 to a particular organization that pro-
vides a quasi-public good (the organization and the
good are described in some detail below). The is-
sue that arises here is that the referenda are not
“closed.” The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, as
applied to the referenda conducted by CEHM, re-
lies on the maintained hypothesis that there is no
possibility for provision of the good outside the
voting group. If this is not the case, then the ref-
erendum is no longer closed, and voters who sup-
port the project (and would vote yes in a closed
referendum) may misrepresent their preferences
and vote no if they feel that the good will be pro-
vided by others outside the voting group. Essen-
tially, the voters in the group may choose to free-
ride off potential providers of the public good out-
side the group. Thus, if one finds a higher
percentage of voters voting yes in the hypothetical
referenda as compared with identical real refer-
enda, it could be due to free-riding effects in the
real referenda and not hypothetical bias in the hy-
pothetical referenda.8 The referenda conducted by
CEHM, CT, Cummings and Taylor (1998), and
Bjornstad et al. (1997), which allow for provision
of the good outside the immediate voting group,
are not closed referenda. Therefore, their real ref-
erenda—the supposed benchmark with which the
hypothetical referenda are compared-are not nec-
essarily incentive compatible mechanisms for elic-
iting WTP for a public good. Thus, their findings
that higher percentages of respondents vote yes in
the hypothetical referenda as compared with the
real referenda cannot be unequivocally attributed
to the presence of hypothetical bias in their experi-
ments.
The experiments reported here explore the po-
tential effects of closed versus nonclosed referenda
on voting behavior. Theoretically, conducting a134 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
closed referendum would be a simple alteration of
the experiments conducted by CEHM and CT.
However, it is difficult to implement because their
experiments rely on actual nonprofit organizations
to which respondents can donate money if the ref-
erendum passes. It is only in this way that actual
‘‘real world” public goods could be used by
CEHM to evaluate the incentive compatibility of
referenda. To implement a closed referendum, it
was necessary to find an organization that was
willing to provide a public good only in the amount
that is funded by the group participating in the
referendum experiment. Fortunately, as is de-
scribed in the next section, such an opportunity—
one that was also comparable to the referendum
used in CEHM and CT—arose.
Experimental Design
The basic experimental design elements of the
closed referendum experiments consist of the ref-
erendum description, subject recruitment, and pro-
cedures used in conducting the experiments. Each
of these elements is discussed below.
Referendum Design
For comparability of the closed referendum to
those of CEHM and CT, the description of the
“good” and the referendum rules follow theirs as
closely as possible. The good to which subjects
could vote to contribute money in the CEHM and
CT experiments involved contributions to the
Southwest Research and Information Center
(SRIC), a nonprofit environmental organization lo-
cated in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Contributions
were to be used for the purpose of funding the
publication and distribution of a bilingual (English
and Spanish) Citizen’s Guide. This guide was to be
distributed to low-income Hispanic households in
Albuquerque. The guide would inform households
in an area overlying a potentially contaminated
aquifer as to whether or not their drinking water
wells were likely to be contaminated by toxic sub-
stances, how they could have their water tested at
no cost to them, and the alternative actions that
were available to them if they found that their
wells were indeed contaminated, The SRIC’s cost
for publishing and distribution was $5.00 per
guide. Thus, with N subjects in a group each con-
tributing $10,00, N x 2 guides could have been
funded by the group. The proposition on which all
subjects voted in the CEHM and CT experiments
was then:
Proposition:
Everyone here in the room will contribute $10.00 to
the SouthwestResearchandInformationCenter.The
contribution is to be used for the purpose of preparing
and distributing the Citizen’s Guide to households in
the area affected by groundwater contamination.9
Note that at the time the experiments were con-
ducted by CEHM and CT, the Citizen’s Guide was
under development. Thus, at that time, it would
have been reasonable to assume that others (out-
side the experimental group) could also fund the
development and distribution of the Citizen’s
Guide. However, since some time had passed since
the initial experiments were conducted, it was pos-
sible to take advantage of the fact that the SRIC
had completed this program (i.e., had already pub-
lished and distributed the guide) and was no longer
distributing this publication to households in the
area, even though several hundred households had
not received a guide. The SRIC agreed that for the
purposes of this study, it would distribute addi-
tional guides to households if funds were collected
to do so through these experiments, and in the
exact amount funded by the experiment ($5 to pro-
vide one booklet to one household). Thus, the sub-
jects could be offered a unique, one-time opportu-
nity to fund the distribution of the Citizen’s Guide
to low-income households in Albuquerque. 10The
following excerpts illustrate the language used to
describe this opportunity in the real referendum:
The Southwest Research and Information Center
. . . has developed, published and distributed a bilin-
gual (English and Spanish) ‘‘Citizen’s Guide” . . .
[which] identifies the areas that have contaminated
groundwater and the sources of pollution in the com-
munity. While a few hundred families have yet to
receive a Citizen’s Guide, the Southwest Research
and Information Center has terminated this program.
However, for this one time only it has agreed to ac-
cept contributions from this group here today, and
provide Guides to the number of families allowed by
~he amount of your contribution. They would require
(N x $10) to distribute the guide to (N x 2) house-
holds. If everyone in this room were to contribute
$10.00,these moneys would be sufficient to cover the
Center’s cost to prepare and distribute the Citizen’s
Guide to (N x 2) households in this area.
We are then going to have a secret vote to decide
whether or not we will do this: all of us pay $10.00 for
this purpose.
If more than 50% of you vote “yes” on this propo-
sition, all of you will pay $10.00—1 will collect
$10.00 from each of you—and we will send this
money to the Southwest Research and Information
Center with instructions that the money is to be used
to prepare and distribute the Citizen’s Guide to (N x
2) households.Taylor Incentive Compatible Referenda 135
If 50Y0 or fewer of you vote “yes” on this propo-
sition, HOone will pay $10.00, we will not send a
check to the Center and the Citizen’s Guide will not
be distributed to these households.
As the survey administrator reads the above
aloud, she inserts the value for (N x $10) and (N x
2), where N is the number of participants in the
referendum. The hypothetical referendum is con-
ducted in the exact same manner, except the lan-
guage used is subjunctive. For example, the script
reads: “I want you to suppose that for this one time
only [the Southwest Research and Information
Center] would accept contributions from this group
here today” and “Supposing we were to have such
a referendum, we would vote on the following
proposition. . . .‘’ In addition, when describing the
rules of the referendum, the language is “all of you
would pay $10.00” and “we would send this
money . . .“ (emphasis added). Lastly, before the
vote is taken in the hypothetical referendum, sub-
jects are told, “Remember, that even though pay-
ment of money in this referendum is hypothetical,
we ask that you respond to questions as though
they involved real cash payments.”
Recruitment and Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited from students enrolled in
undergraduate courses at Georgia State University
during the 1997 academic quarters. All students
signed consent forms acknowledging that their prtr-
ticipation in the experiment was voluntary and that
they agreed to abide by the rules of a referendum.
They also acknowledged that they had received a
$10.00 participation fee. Subjects then participated
in a series of oral double auctions that required
approximately fifty to sixty minutes to complete.11
The rationale for including the market-based ex-
periment prior to describing and conducting the
referendum relates to the payment of the partici-
pation fee. For control across valuation experi-
ments, each group is paid the same participation
fee, regardless of whether the subjects are to par-
ticipate in a real or a hypothetical referendum (the
same procedure is followed in CEHM and CT), In
experiments where the subjects’ decision-making
behavior could be affected by their receipt of a
participation fee, it is common to involve the sub-
jects in activities for which they “earn” their in-
come.12The use of the oral double auction is an
effort to deal with this problem. Results from pre-
tests of this experimental process suggested the
absence of <‘found money” effects. Subjects re-
ported they felt that they had earned the participa-
tion fee after the hour to hour-and-a-half required
for the experiment. 13
Following the oral double auctions, subjects
completed a brief questionnaire that requested de-
mographic information, and then the referendum
was introduced and conducted, After the ballots
were collected, the vote was tallied. If the referen-
dum passed, and it was an experimental treatment
requiring actual cash payments, the money was
collected and a check was written and mailed to
SRIC by a volunteer subject immediately. 14Fol-
lowing the vote, one last double auction period was
completed, and subjects were then paid the ear-
ningsfrom all periods of the double auctions.15
Experimental Results
The closed referendum experiments were con-
ducted with group sizes of no greater than thirty
students, and no subjects participated in more than
one referendum. Voting outcomes and selected
data summaries are presented in table 1. To iden-
tify whether or not voting behavior is consistent
with the presence of hypothetical bias, the analysis
begins with simple contingency tables and mea-
sures of association. As indicated in table 1, a
greater percentage of respondents voted yes in the
closed hypothetical referenda as compared with the
closed real referenda. Specifically, the yes re-
sponses in hypothetical referenda were 17.9 per-
centage points higher than in the real referenda.
CEHM and CT find a 18.2 and 16.7 percentage
































‘Standard deviations are in parentheses.
bMeans or percentages are based on less than the full sample
due to nonresponses.
‘Income is reported in thousands and is based on the midpoint
of an interval response to a question asking the monthly after-
tax income of the household. Intervals were 0–300, 301L400,
401-500, 501-600, 601-800, 801-1,000, 1,001-2,000, 2,001-
3,000, 3,001<,000, over 4,000.136 October 1998
point difference between hy otheticaI and real ref-
f erenda votes, respectively.1 Pearson and Fisher’s
exact tests are used to test the null hypothesis that
the yes responses in the real and hypothetical ref-
erenda are independent of payment condition. Both
tests reject the hypothesis that there is no signifi-
cant difference between voting behavior in the
closed real and closed hypothetical referenda at the
96?Z0 level of confidence or better. 17Thus, based on
measures of association alone, evidence consistent
with hypothetical bias is found in the closed refer-
enda.
To incorporate respondents’ socioeconomic
characteristics and experimental design features
Table 2. Probit Models’
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into the analysis, probability models were also es-
timated. The socioeconomic characteristics of the
respondents considered in the analysis are the re-
spondent’s age, marital status, gender, income, and
race. Experimental design variables that could vary
across respondents are the number of subjects in
the experimental session, the earnings of the re-
spondent from the oral double auction, and the
referendum treatment (e.g., hypothetical or real).
Results are presented in table 2. In each model,
whether or not the respondent voted yes is the de-
pendent variable, Standard errors are computed us-
ing the P,J. Huber (1967) formula for robust stan-
dard errors, generalized to allow for observations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Variable (z-statistic) Effectb (z-statistic) Effectb (z-statistic) Effectb
Referendum was real = 1 -0,526
(2.57)
Referendum was closed = 1
Age in years
Gender = 1 if male
Married = 1 if married
Yearly income in
thousands of dollars





were not CEHM’s = 1C













Subject was paid auction
earnings = 1C
Caucasian = 1f -0,090
(0.30)
Asian = 1 0.523
(2.12)
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‘In all models the dependent variable is whether the respondent voted yes ( = 1) or no ( = O) in the referendum.
bMarginal effects are computed at the mean of the observed data.
“Instructions used to describe the double auction to subjects were different in CT and in CEHM. The instructions used by CT were
shorter and clearer, so these instructions were also used here in the closed referendum experiments.
‘CEHM conducted some experiments on groups of adults (nonstudents),
‘CEHM conducted some experiments where respondents were not paid their double auction earnings (i.e., the auction was
hypothetical).
‘African-American is the category not included in the model,Taylor Incentive Compatible Referenda 137
arising from cluster sampling (each experimental
group may be considered a cluster). The variable
indicating that a respondent participated in a hy-
pothetical referendum is the categorical variable
not included in each model.
Consider first models 1and 2. Model 1reports a
“full” model containing all socioeconomic char-
acteristics and experimental design features that
varied across experiments, Model 2 is more parsi-
monious: it retains only parameters that are signifi-
cant at the 75% or better level of confidence, Also
reported are the estimated marginal effects, which
are the models evaluated at the mean of the ob-
served data. The results suggest that the payment
conditions of the closed referendum—whether real
or hypothetical—significantly affects voting be-
havior. As reported in table 2, the parameter esti-
mates for the variable indicating whether or not the
referendum was real is negative and highly signifi-
cant. The probability that a respondent votes yes to
the proposition is almost 20% lower in a real ref-
erendum as compared with the hypothetical refer-
endum (19.770 in model 1 and 19.3% in model 2).
Similarly, CEHM and CT find that participating in
a real referendum reduces the probability that a
respondent votes yes to the Albuquerque proposi-
tion by 18.9% and 21.8%, respectively, amounts
commensurate with the results reported here. Other
than the variable indicating the referendum treat-
ment, the income of the respondent and whether or
not the respondent is Asian (as compared with Af-
rican American—the category left out of the
model) are the only other significant predictors of
voting behavior in models 1 and 2.
For comparison purposes, the referenda results
for the Albuquerque booklet-distribution good
used in CT are pooled with the data from the
closed referenda. The percentage of respondents
who voted yes in CT was 46.470 in the hypothetical
referenda and 29.7’%0 in the real referenda. Note
that these percentages are different from what is
observed in the closed referenda. However, it is not
surprising that the voting responses might be dif-
ferent since the “good” in CT is different from
that of the closed referenda. In CT, the proposition
was to donate money to help develop and distribute
the Citizen’s Guide, while the proposition in the
closed referenda was for donations to distribute
additional booklets (already developed) to house-
holds that had not yet received them. In the closed
referenda, the booklets had already been prepared
and distributed to some households, and so the
perceived connection between donations and the
actual provision of booklets may have been differ-
ent in these referenda as compared with those con-
ducted by CEHM and CT.
Model 3 in table 2 presents the results from
pooling the CT data with the closed referenda. In
their analysis, CT pool 211 observations from
CEHM, Thus, the data here are essentially pooled
from both CEHM and CT. Because the experimen-
tal methods used in CEHM differed somewhat
from those of CT and from those used here, addi-
tional variables had to be included in model 3 to
capture these differences. Specifically, the experi-
mental design elements that varied were whether
or not subjects were paid their earnings from the
double auction, whether or not subjects were stu-
dents, and which of two versions of a script was
used to describe the double auction. These vari-
ables are described in more detail in the notes to
table 2. Interestingly, the results indicate that the
categorical variable indicating whether or not the
referendum was closed is not a significant predic-
tor of voting behavior. However, whether or not
the referendum was real has a strong effect on the
probability that a respondent would vote yes, re-
ducing that likelihood by 21% in the real referen-
dum—an amount consistent with the results from
models 1 and 2. The age of the respondent and
whether or not the respondent was Asian are also
significant predictors of voting behavior. The ver-
sion of the script that was used to describe the
double auction was the only experimental design
variable that was a significant predictor of voting
behavior in model 3. The script used by CEHM
significantly reduced the probability that a respon-
dent would vote yes as compared with the script
used in CT (and used here in the closed referenda).
Conclusions
To date, the experimental evidence is far from de-
finitive in showing that hypothetical surveys elic-
iting WTP for public goods generate different re-
sults from those involving actual cash payments
because of a “pure” hypothetical bias effect. In-
deed, a perfectly demand-revealing mechanism for
eliciting WTP in actual payment scenarios for
“real-world” public goods has yet to be imple-
mented. This is because mechanisms for eliciting
WTP for public goods that are theoretically de-
mand revealing (such as the Groves-Ledyard 1977
mechanism) tend to be very unwieldy or impos-
sible to implement with actual public goods.18The
practical issues of implementing experiments with
field public goods typically results in the violation
of some of the maintained hypotheses required for
the mechanism to be incentive compatible. This is
not unique to the use of experiments to validate
hypothetical surveys. In practically all inquiries138 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
into individual choices, the ideal conditions upon
which theoretical predictions of individual choices
rely are violated. In the referendum experiments
discussed in this paper, as in most demand studies,
it cannot be unequivocally stated whether the test-
able hypothesis has been shown to be false, or
whether one of the maintained hypotheses under-
lying the test of the hypothesis has failed.
This paper highlights the “observational equiva-
lence” in the results from past tests for hypotheti-
cal bias that relied on binary choice, majority rule
referendum experiments. Because the ideal condi-
tions under which the referendum is a demand re-
vealing mechanism were violated in these past
studies, it is not possible to determine whether the
differences in responses to hypothetical and real
referenda were due to free-riding or hypothetical
bias. The experiments presented here attempt to
incorporate the theoretically desirable feature for a
referendum that was not included in earlier experi-
ments (that it be a closed referendum). Results in-
dicate that the percentage of yes responses to the
hypothetical referenda were greater than those of
the real referenda—evidence consistent with the
earlier studies and consistent with hypothetical
bias. However, as noted earlier, even the experi-
mental design used here is not ideal. Indeed, the
experiments presented here highlight the difficulty
of implementing seemingly simple mechanisms
that, under ideal conditions, are demand revealing
mechanisms for valuing public goods. Nonethe-
less, it is hoped that the evidence presented, in
conjunction with the evidence from earlier refer-
enda experiments, are compelling enough to sug-
gest that hypothetical binary choice, majority rule
referenda are not fully incentive compatible
mechanisms for eliciting WTP for public goods.
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Notes
1. Real valuation questions are those where actual
payments are required on the part of the respondent
if the provision rule is met.
2. See, as examples, Brown et al. (1996), Cum-
mings et al. (1995), Fox et al. (forthcoming), Loo-
mis et al. (1994), and Neill et al. (1994). Two
studies where hypothetical bias is not identified in
willingness to pay estimates are Brookshire and
Coursey (1987) and Dickie, Fisher, and Shelby
(1987). Smith and Mansfield (1997) fail to find
hypothetical bias in an experiment based on will-
ingness-to-accept questions.
3, For instance, with validity tests using private
goods, the real payment surveys may suffer from
field-censoring wherein subjects reveal only a
WTP that is their perception of the market price for
the commodity plus some premium for the reduc-
tion in transactions costs resulting from having the
opportunity to purchase the product in the experi-
ment. See Johannesonn, Liljas, and O’Connor
(1997) as an example where this may be the case.
4. CT fail to find evidence of hypothetical bias in
one particular set of referenda involving funding
the completion of a local recreational project.
5. Thanks are due to Richard Carson for bringing
this issue to our attention. This issue also applies to
the referenda conducted by Bjomstad, Cummings,
and Osborne (1997) and Cummings and Taylor
(1998) since they use the same referendum design
as CEHM.
6. More correctly, if voters have strict preference
orderings (i.e., they cannot be indifferent to the two
choices) and the choice is binary, then a voting rule
that is monotonic is strategy-proof. Monotonicity
implies that a new supporter can do no harm—
which is the case in a binary choice, majority rule
referendum.
7. See Brown et al. (1996) as an example. Neill
and Taylor (1998) conduct experiments using a
voluntary contribution method and correct for free-
riding effects in their analysis,
8. This conclusion requires the assumption that
there is no incentive (or less of an incentive) to
free-ride in the hypothetical referenda—an as-
sumption that is an open empirical question.
9. The experimenter reads the proposition aloud at
the same time it is shown on an overhead and
inserts the number of households that would re-
ceive a booklet if the referendum passes (equal to
N x 2 households) where the overhead reads
“household in the area.”
10. Note that it is necessary to run multiple ex-
periments to achieve the necessary sample size for
analysis, While subjects in any one experiment are
not told that there will be other similar experiments
(and the experiments are not advertised, as is
sometimes done for recruiting purposes), it is pos-
sible that subjects could think that other experi-
ments were going to be conducted and that those
groups might choose to fund the Citizen’s Guide.
Unfortunately, we have no way to determine to
what degree this was the case.
11. See Davis and Holt (1993, appendix A.1) for
an outline of how an oral double auction is con-
ducted,
12. Such effects are described as “endowment”
and “found money” effects (see Rutstrom, forth-
coming) and may arise in instances where subjects
view the participation fee as money that must be
spent in the experiment. In these experiments, it
could be the case that subjects do not treat the fee
as part of their disposal income.
13, Of course, there is no way to be positive that
this design succeeds in eliminating behavior con-
sistent with found money effects in all cases, See
Bjornstad, Cummings, and Osborne (1997) for a
more detailed discussion of the rationale for using
the oral double auction in this type of valuation
experiment.
14. Because the experiments were conducted on
the campus at Georgia State University, there was
a mailbox nearby for each experiment.
15. The mean earning in the oral double auction
was $1.34 (standard deviation is $0.53), with a
minimum value of $0.00 and a maximum value of
$2.45.
16. CT, who extended the CEHM data by 105 ob-
servations, found that 46.4% of respondents voted
yes in the hypothetical referenda (211 observa-
tions) and 29.7% voted yes in the real referenda
(182 observations)—a difference of 16.7 percent-
age points.
17. The Pearson X2statistic is 5,0181 (p-value =
0,025), and the Fisher’s exact p-value is 0.037 for
the two-sided test, and 0.019 for the one-sided test.
18. See Carson (1997) for an example of the
Groves-Ledyard mechanism in a laboratory envi-
ronment. Rose et al. (1997) test a provision point
mechanism with a field public good as a poten-
tially demand revealing mechanism that is easily
implemented, However, the mechanism they em-
ploy has been tested only in the laboratory under
conditions of actual payments and not hypothetical
payments.